nemo_outis wrote:

> nobody@aes256.cn (Anonymous) wrote in news:f0c6f944956a469714d047cbab689929
> @aes256.cn:
>
> > None of that has anything at all to do with what the guy was
> > talking about. Nobody is even suggesting the use of Truecrypt would
> > be hidden, he's talking about hardening Truecrypt's plausible
> > deniability by using hidden volumes to create two completely
> > separate encrypted OS installs, and using the password mechanism as
> > a sort of boot loader. Is such a thing possible?
> >
> > Please..... if you don't understand the question don't try and give
> > an answer.
>
>
> I understand the question very well.
>
> And my answer is twofold:
>
> 1) I cannot currently be done with Truecrypt
>
> 2) That it cannot be done is no loss since it's a silly idea in the first
> place.

So you're saying Truecrypt's hidden volumes are a silly idea?

Fascinating.

Oh wait, you're just being a vindictive little snipe because you got
your ass handed to you over your Bestcrypt foible, and you mistakenly
though you were striking back. You know full well the ability to create
a "hidden system" volume would be near perfect plausible deniability
because by the very definition of hidden volume as Truecrypt provides,
it would be impossible to know if/where that volume existed, and not
having the "host" volume mounted at all would mean nothing could leak
to that copy of an OS across the encrypted boundrary. Additionally, the
two password scheme used by normal hidden volumes would both protect
the hidden volume, and provide a sort of "dead man" that could easily
destroy the hidden evidence through normal use of the host volume.

Pitty such a poetically secure isn't possible. Or is it? Did you
actually try it, or is this just another nemo_outhouse crapper load of
guesses and wishes?