OK. I read Merkle approaches to public key cryptography long time ago,
and I am aware of some Eurocrypt and Asiancrypt papers but in my honest
opinion cryptology is not only about algorithms or access protocols. On
1991 I published about some PANDORA approaches, and now "we" (at least
in Spanish I got some very respected experts on computer security to
understand some new ideas) are thinking in a "doberman pen drive" that
can ciphper a partion, can contaminate from another one, and can
attack, even physically, some electronics of the computer where it is
being unauthoricedly used. As far as we foresaw, there are 5
problems/solutions for pen drives:

1. The legal approach to be completely sure that the cracker is very
well aware that he/she is not authoriced.
2. False/true data inside (magical/theatre/humour/fun)
3. Software (internal and external) beyond known cryptosystems
4. Hardware vulnerabilities from USB interface
5. Messages or any tracking way from the pen drive to any open channel
of the owner

I admit that it is just a brain-storming, but we are free to project
many things in our pen drives, and of course, some ideas are only for
people involved. However, I am always open to suggestions of whoever
knows more than me about anything....

I am very happy to learn that I now very little about almost nothing.
However, I do not think that Feistel, Kerckchoffs, Shannon clasical
fundamentals or, for instance, Feige-Fiat-Shamir or Guillou-Quisquater
identification schemes or Diffie-Hellman key exchanges have too much to
do with USB pen drives real risks. I foresee new approaches specific
for pen drives even if I am not smart enough to explain my intuitions
right now, sorry. I know some of my limits, and that one is here right
now.

miguel, www.cita.es/conmigo

Joseph Ashwood ha escrito:

> "Miguel A. Gallardo en http://www.cita.es" <miguelito.gallardo@gmail.com>
> wrote in message
> news:1154104396.872626.204240@m79g2000cwm.googlegr oups.com...
> > Illusionism and cryptology are 2 very complementary
> > approaches to pen drives in my honest opinion.
>
> Now we're getting somewhere. It seems you have never been actually
> introduced to cryptography. Well then I'll revise my earlier statement of
> the three important cryptologists, remove Feistel and add Kerckhoffs. If you
> actually understand Kerckhoffs principles you will very quickly see that
> illusionism/magic/mysticism/anything else that has at points in history been
> linked has nothing to do with cryptography. To summarize:
> 1. The system must be practically, if not mathematically, indecipherable;
> 2. It must not be required to be secret, and it must be able to fall into
> the hands of the enemy without inconvenience;
> 3. Its key must be communicable and retainable without the help of written
> notes, and changeable or modifiable at the will of the correspondents;
> 4. It must be applicable to telegraphic correspondence;
> 5. It must be portable, and its usage and function must not require the
> concourse of several people;
> 6. Finally, it is necessary, given the circumstances that command its
> application, that the system be easy to use, requiring neither mental strain
> nor the knowledge of a long series of rules to observe
>
> You will find that in particular magic/illusionism breaks 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6,
> and that some examples break 5 as well.
>
> You have once again demonstrated that you don't have the foundation
> knowledge necessary, it is necessary for you to read up on the implications
> of Kerckhoffs principles, on Shannon's work, and on Viginere's effects even
> today simply in order to understand your own question.
> Joe