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peoples fuck perosnal fuck inforfuck fuck then you fuck go and fuck
post some shit. fuck here is some fuck info on this spammer Jamie
Baillie:

Jamie Baillie
3-42 Saranac Blvd
North York, ON
Canada, M6A 2G5

Home Phone #: 416-781-0627
Cell Phone #: 416-450-1717


SpamFuck also drives a blue Oldsmobile, Ontario license plate ACYM
544

Fuck his is a shitted up fuck that fuck picks up crackwhores fucks them
then fuck looks for sheep fuck to fuck.

Kevin Cletis.





Jamie wrote:
> Court Documents about Gregory S. Tift and his spamming
> operation.
>
> http://groups.google.com/group/news....2fd55597e4548d
>
>
> http://groups.google.com/group/news....3f49407?hl=en&
>
> "Here is Greg's home address:
> 6430 174th Pl SE
> Snohomish, WA 98296-5306
>
> He lives with his girlfriend and baby's mama Rebecca. He drives a
> green 2003-4 Range Rover. He is a jack ass. Greg and Rebecca used to
> or still do run Ethan Enterprises (Ethan is their son) out of the same
> location as Maxxlength.
>
> This is the REAL office address:
> 22125 17th Ave Se, Suite 113
> Bothell, WA 98021
>
> His office bitch is Amber (about as sharp as a marble).
>
> Greg is not the CEO.. it's actually Michael Kerr (hence the MK in MK
> Supplements) but Michael doesn't know what the hell is going on. He
> just has the bank account (B of A) and doesn't know all the laws being
> broken. Gregory S Tift does though. Greg is the CFO.... to protect
> himself... but Greg signs all the checks for Michael. He has had
> Paul Boes on his staff forever. Paul built the shipping system for
> him and the shopping cart(s). Paul also manages the mailers for him
> and mails for him.. well at least tries."
>
>
> His partner in crime is Paul Boes of Boes Consulting
> yet another spammer.
>
> http://www.spamhaus.org/rokso/listin...consulting.net
>
>
> He also uses the business name of Ethan Enterprises Inc.
>
>
> http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_file...(SF)-07-04.htm
>
>
> UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
>
> BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
>
> DIVISION OF JUDGES
>
> SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
>
>
> ETHAN ENTERPRISES, INC.
>
> and Case 19-CA-28877
>
>
>
> DISTRICT COUNCIL #5, INTERNATIONAL
>
> OF PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES,
>
> AFL-CIO
>
>
>
>
> Daniel Sanders Esq., Seattle, WA,
> for the General Counsel.
>
>
> J. Patrick Brown, Esq. (McKay Huffington),
> Seattle, WA, for Respondent.
>
>
> Richard H. Robblee, Esq., (Rinehart and Robblee),
> Seattle, WA, for the Union.
>
>
> DECISION
>
>
>
> Statement of the Case
>
>
>
> JAY R. POLLACK, Administrative Law Judge: I heard this case in trial at
> Seattle, Washington, on December 4, 2003. On August 26, 2003, District
> Council #5, International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, AFL-CIO
> (the Union) filed the charge alleging that Ethan Enterprises, Inc.,
> (Respondent) committed certain violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
> the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. Section 151 et
> seq., herein called the Act). On October 29, 2003, the Union filed an
> amended charge against Respondent. On October 31, 2003, the Regional
> Director for Region 19 of the National Labor Relations Board issued a
> complaint and notice of hearing against Respondent, alleging that
> Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Respondent filed
> a timely answer to the complaint, denying all wrongdoing. In addition
> Respondent alleged lack of jurisdiction, lack of due process, breach of
> settlement agreement [by the Union] and breach of duty of good faith and
> fair dealing.
>
>
>
> The parties have been afforded full opportunity to appear,
> to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine
> witnesses[1], and to file briefs. Upon the entire[2] record[3], from my
> observation of the demeanor of the witnesses,[4] and having considered
> the post-hearing briefs of the parties, I make the following:
>
>
>
> Findings of Fact and Conclusions
>
> I. Jurisdiction
>
> Respondent denied service of the charge and amended charge.
> The formal documents show that the Union filed the charge on August
> 26, 2003. A copy was sent to Respondent by regular mail that same date.
> In a letter dated September 2, 2003, Respondent's president, Rebecca
> Johnson and Greg Tift, Respondent's executive operations manager, wrote
> Region 19 of the Board acknowledging receipt of the charge in Case
> 19-CA-28877. Respondent denied the allegations of the charge. The
> letter also stated "We refuse to defend ourselves against an issue that
> is over, it is only harassment at this point. Please close the case."
> Enclosed with that letter was a copy of the instant charge on which Tift
> had written, "There is no agreement." At the hearing, Respondent moved
> to dismiss the complaint based on an alleged failure to serve the
> charge. The motion was denied. The record clearly establishes that the
> charge was served on Respondent in a timely manner.
>
>
>
> Respondent also denied service of the complaint. The
> complaint issued on October 31, 2003. The complaint was served on
> Respondent by regular mail and certified mail. Respondent refused to
> accept the certified mail and it was returned to Region 19. The regular
> mailed was not returned. The Region also served a copy of the complaint
> on Respondent's
>
> attorney J. Patrick Brown.[5] Brown filed a timely answer to the
> complaint denying all allegations of the complaint except the allegation
> that Respondent was a Washington corporation engaged in the business of
> selling and installing commercial floor coverings. The record
> establishes proper service of the complaint and that Respondent had
> actual knowledge of the complaint.[6]
>
>
>
> Respondent admits that it is a State of Washington
> corporation, with an office and place of business in Mill Creek,
> Washington, where it is engaged in the business of selling and
> installing commercial floor coverage. Respondent denied that it was an
> employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and
> (7) of the Act. More specifically, Respondent denied that it sold goods
> or services in excess of $50,000 to customers who were themselves
> engaged in interstate commerce, by other than indirect means. In Cases
> 19-CA-28319, et al., Respondent stipulated that its sales to customers,
> who met the Board's direct standards for asserting jurisdiction over
> non-retail employers, were in excess of $50,000.
>
>
>
> In this case, the evidence established that in the twelve
> months prior to the issuance of the complaint, Respondent sold goods and
> services valued in excess of $140,000 to Absher Construction at
> construction projects inside the State of Washington. Absher purchased
> and received goods valued in excess of $80,000 directly from outside the
> State of Washington for these construction projects. Further,
> Respondent sold goods and services in excess of $50,000 to Eric Hoffman
> Company of Washington, Inc., at construction sites within the State of
> Washington. Hoffman purchased and received goods and services valued in
> excess of $50,000 from outside the State of Washington. Accordingly, I
> find that Respondent meets the Board's indirect outflow standard for
> asserting jurisdiction over non-retail enterprises. Thus, I find
> Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
> Section 2(2)(6) and (7) of the Act.
>
>
>
> Respondent denies that the Union is a labor organization
> within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. The Union is a District
> Council of local unions of the International Union of Painters and
> Allied Trades. Carpet, Linoleum and Soft Tile Layers Local Union No.
> 1238 is a local union affiliated with the Union. Employees of various
> contractors are members of Local 1238. These employees participate in
> Local 1238, which represents employees for purposes of collective
> bargaining. The employee-members of Local 1238 elect delegates to the
> Union. The Union represents employees, including the members of Local
> 1238, for purposes of collective bargaining. The Union is party, with
> various employers, to a Master Labor Agreement with Western Washington
> Independent Floor Covering Employers. As will be seen below, it is
> Respondent's failure to execute and abide by the Master Labor Agreement,
> which forms the basis of this case. Both the Union and Local 1238 deal
> with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
> pay, hours of employment, and other employment conditions. Accordingly,
> I find that the Union and Local 1238 are both labor organizations within
> the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
>
>
>
> II. Background and Issues
>
> Respondent is a commercial floor covering company operating
> in Washington, Oregon, Arizona and California. On June 23, 2003, it
> entered into a settlement agreement in Cases 19-CA-28319, 19-CA-28439
> and 19-CA-28702 with the Union. Pursuant to that agreement, Respondent
> agreed to adopt and become party to the Master Labor Agreement. It
> further agreed not to contest the Union's majority status. The Union
> agreed that Respondent would only have to pay 50% of back pay and
> benefits for the period from June 6, 2002 to June 23, 2003. The
> agreement was predicated on the trust funds specified in the labor
> agreement waiving certain damages for fringe benefits for the period
> June 6, 2002, to June 23, 2003. The Union also agreed to waive all but
> $75 of its initiation fee not applied to membership dues for non-member
> Ethan employees.
>
>
>
> Beginning in June 2003 and continuing until the date of the
> hearing, the Union sought to obtain compliance with the settlement
> agreement. To date, Respondent has not signed nor agreed to abide by the
> Master Labor Agreement.
>
>
>
> Within this factual framework, the General Counsel alleges
> that Respondent unlawfully refused to execute and abide by the terms of
> an agreed upon contract. Respondent contends that there is no contract.
> Secondly, Respondent contends that its employees have rejected the Union
> as their bargaining representative. The complaint further alleges that
> Respondent failed and refused to furnish the Union information relevant
> to collective bargaining.
>
>
>
> III. The Facts
>
>
>
> As stated above, on June 23, 2003, Respondent entered into
> an agreement to adopt and become party to the Master Labor Agreement.
> It further agreed not to contest the Union's majority status. On June
> 24, Odie Carter, a business representative for the Union, and Phillip
> Lindquist an organizer for the Union, visited Respondent's headquarters
> in an attempt to obtain a signed Labor Agreement. Gregg Tift,
> Respondent's executive operations manager, told the Union agents that
> Rebecca Johnson, Respondent's president, would not be at work that day
> and that Johnson had five days to sign the agreement. Carter and
> Lindquist then explained the trust fund forms to an office clerical.
>
>
>
> Approximately one week later, Tift requested a copy of the
> Union's constitution. Carter answered that copies of the constitution
> were available for the employees. Tift stated that he had not found any
> employees who wanted the Union. Carter answered that he did not know of
> any who did not want the Union. Tift asked if he could pay the Union to
> go away and Carter answered no.
>
>
>
> On or about July 3, Carter and Lindquist met with
> Respondent's employees in the presence of Tift. Carter attempted to
> explain the Union benefit plans to the employees. However, employees
> who expressed dissatisfaction with having to join the Union interrupted
> Carter's presentation. After attempting to explain the Union security
> clause of the contract, Carter determined that he had a hostile audience
> and he and Lindquist left the facility.
>
>
>
> On July 8 Carter delivered to Respondent a letter that he
> labeled a formal grievance. In the grievance, Carter complained that
> the collective-bargaining agreement had not yet been signed, the
> union-security clause had not been enforced, and the benefits bond had
> not been complied with. In addition, Carter requested the names and
> phone numbers of Respondent's employees. Carter further explained that
> the agreement contained a grievance and arbitration clause. Finally,
> Carter noted that if these matters were not resolved within 20 days the
> Union would seek arbitration.
>
>
>
> On July 14 Carter notified Respondent that the trust plans
> had accepted the June 23 settlement agreement between Respondent and the
> Union. Carter told Tift that all the waivers required by the settlement
> had been accepted and that the Union was ready for the Labor Agreement.
> Tift said that he did not expect the trust funds to accept the
> settlement and he expected the settlement to be null and void. Tift
> told Carter "agreements are made to be broken." Carter responded, "The
> agreement was not made to be broken but made to be adhered to."
>
>
>
> On July 22 Carter sent Tift and Johnson another formal
> grievance complaining that Respondent had not complied with "all aspects
> of the [June 23] agreement." The Company did not responded to either
> the July 8 or July 22 grievances. On July 28, Carter delivered a letter
> to Respondent in which he responded to a purported employee petition
> rejecting the Union. Carter reviewed the facts leading up to the
> Respondent's failure to sign the agreed upon contract. Carter stated
> that the Union intended to enforce the June 23 agreement and demanded
> that Respondent sign the Master Labor Agreement. He further demanded
> the names and addresses of all bargaining unit employees and records
> showing wages, hours and benefits paid. Finally, Carter demanded that
> Respondent submit to an audit by the trust funds and that Respondent
> schedule a grievance meeting concerning the pending grievances. A
> meeting was scheduled for August 20. However, Tift cancelled the meeting.
>
>
>
> On August 5 an attorney for the trust funds wrote
> Respondent requesting an audit pursuant to the Master Labor Agreement.
> On August 6 the Union's attorney wrote Respondent in an attempt to
> select an arbitrator to hear the Union's grievances of July 8 and July
> 22. Respondent refused to accept the certified letter from the Union's
> attorney. However, the copy sent by regular mail was not returned.
>
>
>
> On August 26 Carter wrote Tift and Johnson requesting an
> audit for the trust funds. He further requested that Respondent provide
> the previously requested information concerning employee names,
> addresses and compensation. Finally, he requested that Respondent
> terminate its apprenticeship program and utilize the apprenticeship
> program provided for in the Master Labor Agreement. That same date, the
> Union filed the instant charge against Respondent. On August 28 Johnson
> and Tift wrote the attorney for the trust funds and contended that there
> was "no collective Bargain [sic] agreement." The letter stated, "Please
> respect the wishes of our employees and please discontinue the Legal
> Bombardment that is being reigned on Ethan Enterprises, Inc."
>
>
>
> On September 2 Johnson and Tift wrote the acting Regional
> Director complaining about the actions of Carter and Lindquist. The
> letter stated, inter alia, "We discount any charge the NLRB or [the
> Union] makes, because it is all fiction and fabricated by these two
> individuals." A copy of this letter was sent to the Union's attorney.
> That same date, Johnson and Tift wrote the acting Regional Director a
> letter acknowledging receipt of the charge and denying the allegations
> of the charge. They requested "the Union stop, and have no further
> contact with our company. We refuse to defend ourselves against an
> issue that is over, it is only harassment at this point." Enclosed was
> a copy of the charge on which Tift had written, "There is no agreement."
>
>
>
> On September 8, Johnson and Tift wrote the Union's attorney
> stating, "Your assault on Ethan Enterprises, Inc., needs to cease." The
> letter accused the Union of "harassment and threats towards the company
> and its employees." Finally, the letter stated, "June 24th, the 5-day
> deadline went and passed. The agreement was poison [sic] by local 1238
> business agents. The Union has been rejected by all Ethan employees.
> Please discontinue your actions as this matter is closed."
>
>
>
> On September 30, the Union's attorney wrote Respondent in
> an effort to select an arbitrator to hear the Union's grievances.
> Respondent refused the certified letter but the letter sent by
> registered mail was not returned. After receiving no response from the
> Company, on October 16, the Union's attorney again wrote Respondent
> regarding the selection of an arbitrator. Again the certified letter
> was refused but Respondent apparently received the letter by regular mail.
>
>
>
> In October, the trust funds joined by the Union brought
> suit against Respondent in the United States District for the Western
> District of Washington for failure to make proper payments under the
> Master Labor Agreement. Respondent filed a counterclaim and third party
> complaint. That suit was pending at the time of the instant trial.
>
>
>
> IV. Analysis and Conclusions
>
> A. The refusal to sign the agreed upon contract
>
> Section 8(d) of the Act explicitly requires the parties to
> a collective-bargaining relationship to execute "a written contract
> incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party." H. J.
> Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941). It is well established that an
> employer's failure to reduce to writing an agreement reached with a
> union constitutes an unlawful refusal to bargain. H. J. Heinz Company v.
> N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 514 (1941). "When an oral agreement is reached as to
> the terms of a collective-bargaining contract, each party is obligated,
> at the request of the other, to execute that contract when reduced to
> writing, and a failure or refusal to do so constitutes" a violation of
> Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Liberty Pavilion Nursing Home, 259 NLRB 1249
> (1982); Interprint Co., 273 NLRB 1863 (1985). "It is well established
> that technical rules of contract do not control whether a
> collective-bargaining agreement has been reached." Pepsi-Cola Bottling
> Co. v. NLRB, 659 F.2d 87, 89 (8th Cir. 1981). Rather, the crucial
> inquiry is whether there "is conduct manifesting an intention to abide
> and be bound by the terms of an agreement." Capital Husting Co. v. NLRB,
> 671 F.2d 237, 243 (7th Cir. 1982).
>
>
>
> In determining whether underlying oral agreement has been
> reached, the Board is not strictly bound by technical rules of contract
> law but is free to use general contract principles adopted to the
> bargaining context. Americana Healthcare Center, 273 NLRB 1728 (1985).
> The burden of proof is on the party alleging the existence of the
> contract. Cherry Valley Apartments, 292 NLRB 38 (1988).
>
>
>
> In the instant case, the General Counsel has shown that an
> agreement was reached, and that the document, which Respondent has
> refused to execute, reflected that agreement. Here the undisputed
> evidence establishes that the parties negotiated a settlement agreement,
> which required Respondent to execute a copy of the Master Labor
> Agreement with the Union. Without legal justification, Respondent has
> refused to execute that labor agreement. First, Respondent contended
> that it had five days to sign the labor agreement. Next, Respondent
> argued that agreements are made to be broken. Later, Respondent
> contended that the five days had past and that the matter was concluded.
>
>
>
> The evidence shows that the agreement was subject to the
> trust funds waiving certain damages on fringe benefits for the period
> June 6, 2002, to June 23, 2003. However, the Union gave Tift timely
> notice that the proper waivers had been obtained. The fact that Tift
> believed, or hoped, that the waivers would not materialize does not
> relieve Respondent of its statutory obligations. When the Union
> informed Respondent that the waivers had been obtained, the sole
> condition precedent had been removed and the labor agreement had been
> reached.
>
>
>
> In Vallejo Retail Trade Bureau, 243 NLRB 762, 767 (1979),
> the administrative law judge stated, with Board approval:
>
>
>
> [T]he expression "meeting of the minds" in contract law does not
> literally require that both parties have identical subjective
> understandings on the meaning of material terms in the contract. Rather,
> subjective understandings (or misunderstandings) as to the meaning of
> terms, which had been asserted to are irrelevant, provided that the
> terms themselves are unambiguous "judged by a reasonable standard."
> Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company, 202 NLRB 880, 888 (1973), and
> authorities cited therein. See also, e.g., Monument Printing Co., Inc.,
> 231 NLRB 1215, 1220 (1977), and authorities cited therein.
>
>
>
> Tift never raised any disagreement with the contract as written with the
> Union. Rather, the alleged disagreements arose after Tift unlawfully
> refused to sign the contract. A contract, binding on Respondent, had
> been reached prior to Respondent's refusal to sign it.
>
>
>
> As stated in Teamsters Local 287 (Reed & Graham), 272 NLRB
> 348 (1984), the test is whether or not applying an objective or
> reasonable standard, irrespective of the subjective opinions of the
> parties, mutual agreement on a contract was reached. Judged by a
> reasonable objective standard, I find that a contract was reached and
> that Respondent was obligated to sign it.
>
>
>
> I find no merit to Respondent's defense that its employees
> rejected the Union. First, Respondent did not present any evidence that
> its employees did not want to be represented by the Union. A petition
> purportedly signed by Respondent's employees was not authenticated.
> Even assuming that the employee petition is authentic, the employees
> signed the petition more than a week after Respondent had unlawfully
> refused to sign the agreed upon contract. The Board has long held that
> an employer may not withdraw recognition from a union while there are
> unremedied unfair labor practices tending to cause employees to become
> disaffected from the union. Olson Bodies, 206 NLRB 779, 780 (1973). As
> one court has stated, a "company may not avoid the duty to bargain by a
> loss of majority status caused by its own unfair labor practices." NLRB
> v. Willimams Enterprises, 50 F.3d 1280, 1288 (4th Cir. 1995). In cases
> involving a withdrawal of recognition, "the causal relationship between
> the unlawful act and subsequent loss of majority support may be
> presumed." Lee Lumber 322 NLRB 175, 178 (1996), enfd. in relevant part
> 117 F.3d 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Thus, in the instant case, the purported
> employee petition was tainted by Respondent's unfair labor practices.
> See Jano Graphics, Inc., 339 NLRB No. 38 (2003). I further note that
> Respondent's employees did not file either a decertification petition or
> a deauthorization petition with the Board.
>
>
>
> B. The Refusal to Furnish Information
>
>
>
> In the instant case, after the unlawful refusal to execute
> and abide by the collective-bargaining agreement, the Union requested
> information relevant to the collective-bargaining process. Respondent
> continued to refuse certified mail from the Union. Respondent
> compounded its errors by failing and refusing to provide the relevant
> information to the Union.
>
>
>
> Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor
> practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the
> representatives of his employees, subject to the bargaining unit
> provisions of Section 9(a). The duty to bargain in good faith requires
> an employer to furnish information requested and needed by the
> employees' bargaining representative for the proper performance of its
> duties to represent unit employees of that employer. NLRB v. Acme
> Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967). A union's request for
> information regarding the terms and conditions of employment of the
> employees employed within the bargaining unit represented by the union,
> is "presumptively relevant" to the Union's proper performance of its
> collective-bargaining duties, Samaritan Medical Center, 319 NLRB 392,
> 397 (1995), because such information is at the "core of the
> employee-employer relationship," Graphics Communications Local 13 v.
> NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 271 fn. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1959), thus it is relevant by
> its "very nature." Emeryville Research Center v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880, 887
> (9th Cir. 1971).
>
>
>
> Therefore, an employer's statutory obligation to provide
> information presupposes that the information is relevant and necessary
> to a union's bargaining obligation vis-à-vis its representation of unit
> employees of that employer. White-Westinghouse Corp., 259 NLRB 220 fn.
> 1 (1981). Whether the requested information is relevant and
> sufficiently important or needed to invoke a statutory obligation to
> provide it is determined on a case-by-case basis.
>
>
>
> In making this determination of relevance, the Board has
> followed the following principles:
>
>
>
> Wage and related information pertaining to employees in the bargaining
> unit is presumptively relevant, for, as such data concerns the core of
> the employer-employee relationship, a union is not required to show the
> precise relevance of it, unless effective employer rebuttal comes forth;
> as to other requested data, however, such as employer profits and
> production figures, a union must, by reference to the circumstances of
> the case, as an initial matter, demonstrate more precisely the relevance
> of the data it desires. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 69
> (3d Cir. 1965), cited with approval in Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 311 NLRB
> 424, 425 (1993).
>
>
>
> Thus, if the requested information goes to the core of the
> employer-employee relationship, and the employer refuses to provide that
> requested information, the employer has the burden to prove either lack
> of relevance or to provide adequate reasons why it cannot, in good
> faith, supply the information. If the information requested is shown to
> be irrelevant to any legitimate union collective-bargaining need,
> however, a refusal to furnish it is not an unfair labor practice.
> [Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 311 NLRB at 425 (citing Emeryville Research
> Center v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1971)].
>
>
>
> The standard to determine a union's right to information
> will be "a broad discovery type standard," which permits the union
> access to a broad scope of information potentially useful for the
> purpose of effectuating the bargaining process. NLRB v. Acme
> Industrial, 385 U.S. at 437, fn. 6; See Also, Anthony Motor Co., Inc.,
> 314 NLRB 443, 449 (1994). There only needs to be "the probability that
> the desired information was relevant, and that it would be of use to the
> union in carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities." Acme
> Industrial, 385 U.S. at 437.
>
>
>
> In this case, all of the information in question: employee
> names, addresses, phone numbers, job classifications, hours worked,
> rates of pay, and benefits, is presumptively relevant. As such, no
> showing of particular need is necessary. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 347 F.2d
> at 69.
>
>
>
> As to employee job classification, it is a condition of
> employment that is presumptively relevant information. Millard
> Processing Services, Inc., 308 NLRB 929, 930 (1992). The same is true
> for rates of pay. Dynatron/Bondo Corp., 305 NLRB 574, 574 (1991); see
> also TEG/LVI Environmental Services, Inc., 328 NLRB 483 (1999),
> Children's Hospital of San Francisco, 312 NLRB 920 (1993).
>
>
>
> As to names, addresses, and telephone numbers, "[t]he
> Union's obligation to represent employees presupposes the ability to
> communicate with them." Howe K. Sipes Co., 319 NLRB 30, 39 (1995). It
> is well settled that the names, addresses, and telephone numbers are
> therefore presumptively relevant information. Dynatron/Bondo Corp., 305
> NLRB at 574; Valley Programs, 300 NLRB 423, 423 (1990); see, e.g.,
> Burkart Foam, 283 NLRB 351 (1987), enfd. 848 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1988);
> Tom's Ford, 253 NLRB 888, 894, 895 (1980).
>
>
>
> As to the wage and benefit information, the Board has found
> that a "[l]ist of current employees containing the names, addresses, job
> classifications, rates of pay and telephone numbers if any" and a
> "[l]ist of present job locations including site addresses" was
> presumptively relevant information "inasmuch as the request relates to
> wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment of the unit
> employees. The Respondent's denial of its relevance, without more, does
> not raise an issue warranting a hearing." TEG/LVI Environmental
> Services, Inc., Id.
>
>
>
> Conclusions of Law
>
>
>
> 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce and in a
> business affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
> of the Act.
>
>
>
> 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
> Section 2(5) of the Act.
>
>
>
> 3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
> by refusing to execute and abide by an agreed upon collective-bargaining
> agreement with the Union.
>
>
>
> 4. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
> Act by failing to provide the Union with relevant information concerning
> employee names, addresses, phone numbers, job classifications, wage
> rates, hours of work, and benefits.
>
>
>
> 5. Respondent's conduct in paragraphs 3 and 4 above are
> unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
> 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
>
>
>
> REMEDY
>
>
>
> Having found Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor
> practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist
> therefrom and take certain affirmative action to effectuate the purposes
> and policies of the Act.
>
>
>
> The Respondent shall be ordered to execute the 2003-2004
> Master Labor Agreement requested by the Union on June 24, 2003. The
> Respondent further shall be ordered to comply with the terms of the
> agreement retroactive to June 24, 2003, the effective date of the
> agreed-upon collective-bargaining agreement, described above. To the
> extent that the Respondent has failed to comply with the terms of the
> above-described contract, it shall be ordered to make whole its
> employees for any loss of earnings and other benefits they may have
> suffered as a result of that failure. Also, to the extent that the
> Respondent has failed to make payments to any benefit funds in the
> amounts required by the above-described contract, it shall be ordered to
> make such funds whole in accordance with the terms of that contract,
> including paying any additional amounts applicable to such delinquent
> payments in accordance with Merryweather Optical Co., 240 NLRB 1213,
> 1216 (1979). In addition, the Respondent shall reimburse unit employees
> for any expenses ensuing from its failure, if any, to make such required
> payments or contributions, as set forth in Kraft Plumbing & Heating, 252
> NLRB 891 fn. 2 (1980), enfd. mem. 661 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981). All
> payments to unit employees shall be computed in the manner set forth in
> Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th
> Cir. 1971), with interest as prescribed in New Horizons for the
> Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987)."[7]
>
>
>
> Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law,
> and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I
> hereby issue the following recommended:[8]
>
>
>
> ORDER
>
>
>
> Respondent, Ethan Enterprises, Inc., its officers, agents,
> successors and assigns shall:
>
>
>
> 1. Cease and desist from:
>
>
>
> a. Failing and refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith
> with the Union, by refusing to execute the 2003-2004 Master Labor
> Agreement, although the terms and conditions of employment had been
> agreed upon.
>
> b. Refusing to provide the Union with requested information
> relevant and necessary to its responsibilities as exclusive
> collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's employees including
> names, addresses, phone numbers, job classification, hours of work, wage
> rates and benefits information.
>
> c. In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining or
> coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in
> Section 7 of the Act.
>
> c.
>
> 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
> effectuate the policies of the Act:
>
>
>
> a. Execute the 2003-2004 Master Labor Agreement as requested by the
> Union.
>
> b. Give retroactive effect to the terms and conditions of the
> collective-bargaining agreement and make whole its employees and the
> Union for any losses they may have suffered by reason of the
> Respondent's refusal to execute the agreement, as set forth in the
> Remedy section of the Decision.
>
> c. Upon request, meet and bargain with the Union as the exclusive
> collective bargaining representative of its employees in the appropriate
> bargaining unit described below with respect to rates of pay, hours of
> employment and other terms and conditions, and if an understanding is
> reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The
> appropriate bargaining unit is:
>
> Included: All employees as described in Respondent's collective
> bargaining agreement with the Union including all journeymen and
> apprentices, electronic pre-press operators,
> camera/stripper/platemakers, press operators, bindery employees and
> driver/helpers.
>
> Excluded: All other employees, supervisors and guards as defined in the Act.
>
>
>
>
>
> d. Within 14 days from the date of this order, provide the Union
> with the information, necessary and relevant to its status as exclusive
> collective bargaining representative, which the Union requested in July
> 2003.
>
> e. Within 14 days after service by the Region, post copies of the
> attached notice marked "Appendix"[9] at its location in Mill Creek,
> Washington. Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
> Director for Region 19, after being signed by Respondent's authorized
> representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt
> thereof, and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter in
> conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are
> customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
> ensure the notices are not altered, defaced or covered by other
> material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings,
> Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
> these proceedings, Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own
> expense, a copy of the notice to all current and former employees
> employed by Respondent at any time since June 24, 2003.
>
> f. Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
> Regional Director for Region 19, a sworn certification of a responsible
> official on a form provided by Region 19 attesting to the steps the
> Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
>
>
>
> Dated: January 16, 2004, San Francisco, California.
>
>
>
>
>
> _____________________
>
> Jay R. Pollack
>
> Administrative Law Judge
>
> APPENDIX
>
> NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
>
>
>
> Posted by Order of the
>
> National Labor Relations Board
>
> An Agency of the United States Government
>
>
>
> After a hearing at which all sides had a chance to give evidence, the
> National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor
> law, Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
> amended, and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
>
>
>
> FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
>
>
>
> Form, join, or assist a union
>
> Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
>
> Act together with other employees for your benefit and
> protection
>
> Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
>
>
>
> WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with District Council #5,
> International Union of Painters and allied Trades, AFL-CIO by failing
> and refusing to sign the agreed upon Master Labor Agreement.
>
>
>
> WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition either directly or impliedly from the
> Union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of our
> employees in the unit described below.
>
>
>
> WE WILL NOT refuse to provide the Union with requested information
> relevant and necessary to its responsibilities as exclusive collective
> bargaining representative of our employees including names, addresses,
> phone numbers, job classifications, wage and benefit information.
>
>
>
> WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain or
> coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in
> Section 7 of the Act.
>
>
>
> WE WILL provide the Union with the information, necessary and relevant
> to its status as exclusive collective bargaining representative, which
> the Union requested in July 2003.
>
>
>
> WE WILL sign the 2003-2004 Master Labor Agreement as requested by the
> Union and WE WILL give retroactive effect to the terms and conditions of
> the collective- bargaining agreement and make whole our employees and
> the Union for any losses they may have suffered by reason of our refusal
> to execute the agreement, with interest.
>
>
>
> WE WILL recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective
> bargaining representative of our employees in the appropriate bargaining
> unit described below with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment
> and other terms and conditions. The bargaining unit is:
>
>
>
> Ethan Enterprises' employees performing work described in the Master
> Labor Agreement between the Western Washington Independent Floor
> Covering Employers and the Union.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ETHAN ENTERPRISES, INC.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> (Employer)
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Dated
>
>
>
>
>
> By
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> (Representative) (Title)
>
>
>
>
>
> The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency
> created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts
> secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union
> representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices
> by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the
> Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak
> confidentially to any agent with the Board's Regional Office set forth
> below. You may also obtain information from the Board's website:
> www.nlrb.gov.
>
>
>
> 915 Second Avenue, Federal Building, Room 2948, Seattle, WA 98174-1078
>
> (206) 220-6300, Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
> POSTING AND MUSTNOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER
> MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THISNOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS
> PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE'S COMPLIANCE
> OFFICER, (206) 220-6284.
>
>
>
> [1] At the hearing Respondent was represented by attorney J. Patrick
> Brown of the Seattle law firm of McKay Huffington, PLLC. During cross
> examination of a witness called by the General Counsel, Brown abruptly
> left the hearing after an adverse ruling. Brown's departure left the
> Respondent without representation, legal or otherwise, at the hearing.
> The hearing proceeded in Brown's absence. At the conclusion of the
> hearing I set a time for the filing of briefs. On December 8, I
> notified Respondent, J. Patrick Brown and McKay Huffington of the date
> for the filing of briefs. Respondent did not file a brief.
>
> [2] On December 31, 2003, the Charging Party filed a motion to correct
> the transcript. As the motion is unopposed, I grant the motion and
> incorporate the corrections as Judge's Exhibit 1.
>
> [3] Respondent objects to the lack of discovery in this proceeding.
> "Pre-trial discovery, perhaps the primary source of delay in civil
> actions, is almost never allowed by the Board." Emhart Industries v.
> NLRB, 907 F.2d 372, 378 (2nd Cir. 1990). The Board has held that while
> some advantages may be gained from prehearing discovery, the fact
> remains that it can be productive of delay, offering, as it does,
> abundant opportunities for collateral disputes. The Board has held that
> the tradeoff reflected in the Board's Rules and Regulations is not
> unreasonable. See David R. Webb Co., 311 NLRB 1135, 1135-1136 (1993)
> and cases cited therein. Neither the Constitution nor the
> Administrative Procedure Act confer a right to discovery in federal
> administrative proceedings. Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB, 893
> F.2d 1468, 1484 (3rd Cir. 1990). See also, NLRB v. Valley Mold Co., 530
> F.2d 693, 695 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824, 97 S.Ct. 77, 50
> L.Ed.2d 86 (1976) (no due process or APA requirement); Frilette v.
> Kimberlin, 508 F.2d 205, 208 (3d Cir.1974) (in banc), cert. denied, 421
> U.S. 980, 95 S.Ct. 1983, 44 L.Ed.2d 472 (1975) (no requirement under the
> APA).
>
> Respondent's attorney would not have waived his objection to the lack of
> discovery by participating in the hearing. The proper course of action
> for attorney Brown would have been to continue to participate in the
> hearing and later, seek to have this precedent reviewed by an
> appropriate United States Court of Appeals.
>
> [4] The credibility resolutions herein have been derived from a review
> of the entire testimonial record and exhibits, with due regard for the
> logic of probability, the demeanor of the witnesses, and the teachings
> of NLRB v. Walton Manufacturing Company, 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962).
>
> [5] J. Patrick Brown represented Respondent at the hearing in Cases
> 19-CA-28319, 19-CA-28349 and 19-CA-28702, on June 23, 2003. Brown
> negotiated a settlement on behalf of Respondent in those cases and Greg
> Tift, signed that agreement at the hearing. Rebecca Johnson later
> signed on behalf of Respondent. Brown is also listed on Respondent's
> Internet web page as Respondent's legal advisor.
>
> [6] Respondent contended that this case be dismissed or deferred because
> the Union seeks arbitration under the Master Labor Agreement. However,
> Respondent contends that it is not bound to the Master Labor Agreement.
> Further, Respondent has failed and refused to participate in the
> arbitration procedure. Deferral in a case that involves total
> repudiation of a collective-bargaining agreement would be contrary to
> Board policy. See Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Co., 207 NLRB 1063, 1064
> (1973) enfd. 505 F. 2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974) cert. denied 423 U.S. 826
> (1975).
>
>
>
> [7] To the extent that an employee has made personal contributions to a
> fund that are accepted by the fund in lieu of the employer's delinquent
> contributions during the period of delinquency, the Respondent will
> reimburse the employee, but the amount of such reimbursement will
> constitute a setoff to the amount that the Respondent otherwise owes the
> fund.
>
> [8] All motions inconsistent with this recommended order are hereby
> denied. In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46
> of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and
> recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
> adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived
> for all purposes.
>
> [9] If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court
> of Appeals, the words in the notice "POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL
> LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" shall read "POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE
> UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
> RELATIONS BOARD."
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
> --
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