Vanguard wrote:
>
> "Barry Watzman" <WatzmanNOSPAM@neo.rr.com> wrote in message
> news:45c4b406$0$9009$4c368faf@roadrunner.com...
> > Re: "The other half of the hash (to decode) was back in the original
> > laptop. Preventing someone from getting at it, especially by stealing
> > the drive, is just what that security is for; i.e., unless the drive
> > is in the original laptop that hashed up the drive's contents AND you
> > know the password, you will never get at the decoded contents of the
> > drive."
> >
> > I don't think that's correct. This isn't windows,
>
> I don't care what OS is on the drive, encrypted or not. The whole-disk
> encryption is performed in hardware. Half of that support is on the
> hard drive, the other half is back in the mobo. If the drive wanders
> off from the mobo that hashed up the drive, that drive cannot be
> decoded. It is very similar to e-mail encryption: the source (owner of
> the certificate or the mobo) has the "private" portion and the target
> (recipient or hard drive) has the "public" portion. Without both,
> there's no decryption, and the source controls that.

Vanguard,


All the drive manufacturers have their own method of enforcing password
protection at this level.

Some of them can be overcome quite easily (for instance, a typical
resurrection for Western Digital drives is to enter, as the password,
WDC repetitively for 32 characters) whereas others (most) require
hardware intervention.

We can recover / obliterate passwords for almost all drives - using
specialist equipment - but for the lucky user of a WD-type drive, it's
fairly straightforward.

The password is rarely stored on multiple media - as far as I can tell
with up-to-date information and experience. (i.e. it's never stored as a
combination of platter-based info (system area) and hardware (BIOS / ROM
/ NVRAM.)



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