"Steevo@my-deja.com" <steevo@my-deja.com> hath wroth:
>As I think I mentioned, the article in Network world wasn't about that
>application. It was about switched wireless networks in enterprise
>use.
I think you mean "wireless switches". These are a mess of dumb
wireless access points, with all the brains in a rack mounted wireless
switch box. It has the major advantage of central administration of
everything. The major problem is that all such solutions tend to be
very proprietary by vendor. There are also some implementations which
are controversial (Meru versus Cisco) in their adherence to
established standards. They have some major benefits in a hospital or
corporate environment. I have a list of vendors (somewhere) if you
want it. Perhaps they offer the utility.
>>Perhaps it would be helpful if you would disclose what problem you are
>>trying to solve with this utility.
>At a medical facility patient privacy is required by law.
>
>Wireless networks are not needed or deployed.
Yeah, I've noticed that. Vendors are so unsure of their installations
of encrypted tunnels and authentication mechanisms that they're
proscribing wireless. I deal with several medical offices, a
pharmacy, and several convalescent hospitals, that have totally
independent wireless systems that never touch the protected LAN with
the medical records. I get the thankless job of proving to the
auditors that the two networks are completely independent.
>But a walk around audit of the building will detect literally dozens
>of wireless clients. It's impossible to find them. Could be staff,
>patients, vendors.
>
>It's also impossible to find out whether the interface metrics are set
>correctly, at least in the time allotted.
>
>What might be possible is to say "Doc, I am from IT. I need to look at
>your task manager for a moment".
I'm not an expert on HIPAA compliance, but I can assure you that the
obstacle course setup by the typical IPSec VPN is sufficient to
prevent both bridging and routing via the clients wireless connection.
As long as the VPN shim is controlling the routing, no packets are
going to go out via the wireless. It's also possible for a VPN client
to detect additional network connections and disable the VPN tunnel
until these additional connections are user disabled.
>As long as the ap is running we can assume it is doing it's job, which
>is a heck of a lot faster that comparing the metrics on the network
>interfaces of some busy radiologist's computer.
Duz "ap" mean "application" or "access point"? The application you're
looking for will probably do what you want, but does not in itself
guarantee that the wireless is disabled (unless imbedded in the VPN
application). For example, the applications might turn off the
wireless on initial startup, but there's nothing to prevent the user
from turning it back on after starting the VPN client and tinkering
with the routing table. This cross checking can get very complicated
very quickly.
The best compromise I've seen is to setup user laptops with two (or
more) user profiles on startup. Profile #1 is called "general
computing" and has everything setup normally including wireless.
However, the VPN client is setup to check the profile and not connect
if running "general computing". Profile #2 is called "secure network"
and disables everything except what's necessary to run the VPN and
associated applications. Also, different user logins for each profile
to avoid cross pollination. This isn't 100% totally HIPAA secure
because a knowledgeable user can hack some of the settings and
download the usual viruses and worms. Make sure your VPN gateway has
a functional virus/worm scanner and IDS running. However, it's been a
reasonably good compromise.
Incidentally, the system setup by one vendor (which I can't find) has
the client checking the process table for a list of applications
running when connected too the VPN. If there's an application that it
doesn't know about, the client will not connect. I can see support
problems with this approach, but it should work with user profiles,
where the applications installed and running can be tightly
controlled.
>In all the world there has to be someone, somewhere who has archived
>that application.
I'll keep looking, but I still think your approach and proposed
solution is seriously lacking. Good luck.
Wireless Security: Ensuring Compliance with HIPAA, GLBA,
SOX, DoD 8100.2 & Enterprise Policy
<http://www.airdefense.net/whitepapers/paper_policy.shtm>
HIPAA and wireless articles:
<http://www.hipaadvisory.com/tech/wireless.htm>
<http://search.techrepublic.com.com/search/hipaa+and+network+security+and+wireless+network.ht ml>
etc...
--
Jeff Liebermann
jeffl@comix.santa-cruz.ca.us
150 Felker St #D
http://www.LearnByDestroying.com
Santa Cruz CA 95060
http://802.11junk.com
Skype: JeffLiebermann AE6KS 831-336-2558