NEWS: Wi-fi and RFID used for tracking

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6691139.stm>

John Navas wrote:
> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6691139.stm>
>
from the article:

"There needs to be standards put in place so the data is not abused for other purposes"
Marcus Birkl, head of wireless at Siemens

why is my cynical-meter redlining right now?

the_bmac <bm@c.com> hath wroth:

>John Navas wrote:
>> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6691139.stm>
>>
>from the article:
>
>"There needs to be standards put in place so the data is not abused for other purposes"
>Marcus Birkl, head of wireless at Siemens
>
>why is my cynical-meter redlining right now?

The articles example application is patient tracking in a hospital.
Would you use a hospital that has problems finding its patients? Never
mind being cynical. I would be seriously worried. (Hint: Try "wrong
patient" for a Google search).

In early 2002, I did the hospital thing for heart problems. As part
of the service, I was wired to a wireless heart monitor. The receiver
went to a recorder at the nurses station. If I drifted too far away,
and alarm would sound. One day, the alarm sounded, but for someone
else. It seems they stepped outside for a cigarette wearing the heart
monitor.

Incidentally, when I went in for surgery, I was interrogated at least
5 times before I was anaesthetized to make sure I was correct patient.
I asked if the nurse-inspector had a photograph of me on file. Nope,
therefore the redundant questions for my name and general condition
extracted from the computer record. Perhaps a cheap camera might be
more useful. I don't think RFID, with or without Wi-Fi will help.

In about 1980, there was a real requirement for people trackers (now
known as RFID). This was immediately after the Three Mile Island
mess. Nuclear power plants wanted to know if anyone was left inside
the plant after a disaster. The scheme was to install a passive
transponder (RFID tag) on the ID badges, with transmitters at all the
entrances. It would not bother to identify who was where, but rather
track how many people were inside or outside. Going through a doorway
without a tag would also alert security. It actually worked, but
there were serious difficulties in reliability, administration,
software interface, and RF interference problem. At the time, I
calculated that it would have been cheaper to issue the latest
Motorola HT to everyone and just ask people where they were located.
27 years later, most of these problems have been solved by using
smartcard ID card readers at the same doorways.



--
Jeff Liebermann jeffl@comix.santa-cruz.ca.us
150 Felker St #D http://www.LearnByDestroying.com
Santa Cruz CA 95060 http://802.11junk.com
Skype: JeffLiebermann AE6KS 831-336-2558

In article <6d1e535mk6ae13i6k393b6tvr9t1pibesq@4ax.com>, Jeff Liebermann wrote:
> the_bmac <bm@c.com> hath wroth:
>
>>John Navas wrote:
>>> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6691139.stm>
>>>
>>from the article:
>>
>>"There needs to be standards put in place so the data is not abused for
>>other purposes"
>>Marcus Birkl, head of wireless at Siemens
>>
>>why is my cynical-meter redlining right now?
>

...(stuff deleted)
>
> In about 1980, there was a real requirement for people trackers (now
> known as RFID). This was immediately after the Three Mile Island
> mess. Nuclear power plants wanted to know if anyone was left inside
> the plant after a disaster. The scheme was to install a passive
> transponder (RFID tag) on the ID badges, with transmitters at all the
> entrances. It would not bother to identify who was where, but rather
> track how many people were inside or outside. Going through a doorway
> without a tag would also alert security. It actually worked, but
^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Not to put too fine a point on it, if you had no transponder on your badge,
how would the sytem know you went through the doorway, and thus alert
security? Were the doors themselves alarmed?

> there were serious difficulties in reliability, administration,
> software interface, and RF interference problem. At the time, I
> calculated that it would have been cheaper to issue the latest
> Motorola HT to everyone and just ask people where they were located.
> 27 years later, most of these problems have been solved by using
> smartcard ID card readers at the same doorways.
>
>
>

W.

watcher@moog.netaxs.com hath wroth:

>Not to put too fine a point on it, if you had no transponder on your badge,
>how would the sytem know you went through the doorway, and thus alert
>security? Were the doors themselves alarmed?

As I recall, there were various types of doors and portals involved.
All the doors to the reactor and generator areas were both alarmed and
guarded. Without going into detail, one normally had to clear several
security systems before being allowed anywhere near the plant.

They didn't want door activation to be dependent on the transponder
RFID tag or someone is sure to get stuck behind a locked door in an
emergency. Doors were locked to prevent unauthorized entry, but all
doors had an exit panic bar. The RFID tags really were only used for
drills and disasters where the exit panic bar was used and the normal
card key and guard activated security was effectively inoperative.

It was also difficult to count the number of people involved in a
panic exit through a doorway. The solution was a mixture of door mat
pressure sensors, IR beams, and ultrasonic sensors. I participated in
a demonstration, where about 20 rented students and bored engineers
tried to simulaneously cram their way through a doorway as fast as
possible. I think we tried it 8 times. The counters got the number
correctly every time except when one wise guy crawled out on his hands
and knees. On the 9th test, the temporary plywood wall and
instrumented doorway fell over from the onslaught and landed on an
equipment cart full of timing hardware. Several people ended up under
the falling wall, but nobody was seriously injured.

Where the sensor system really screwed up was when people were
simultaneously going in, while others were going out. That's
amazingly common, and was the major justification for the RFID people
counter system. That worked correctly every time (if everyone was
wearing a tag), whether walking, running, or crawling through the
door, in either direction.

After Sept 11, 2001, access control got really complicated:
<http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/nuclear_safety/nuclear-reactor-access-zones.html>
<http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/access-authorization.html>
I don't know anything about the current system.


--
Jeff Liebermann jeffl@comix.santa-cruz.ca.us
150 Felker St #D http://www.LearnByDestroying.com
Santa Cruz CA 95060 http://802.11junk.com
Skype: JeffLiebermann AE6KS 831-336-2558

Jeff Liebermann wrote:
> the_bmac <bm@c.com> hath wroth:
>
>> John Navas wrote:
>>> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6691139.stm>
>>>
Snip
> The articles example application is patient tracking in a hospital.
> Would you use a hospital that has problems finding its patients? Never
> mind being cynical. I would be seriously worried. (Hint: Try "wrong
> patient" for a Google search).
>
Snip

I prefer the idea of eqpt asset tracking. Having worked in what was
supposedly a "secure" establishment it was surprising how much eqpt was
"borrowed" without anyone knowing it had been moved until it was due
calibration. Manual checking of assets is a time consuming pain in the neck.
Also at "Interop":-
<http://www.techworld.com/mobility/features/index.cfm?featureID=3397&pagtype=samecatsamechan>

kev <invalid@invalid.invalid> hath wroth:

>I prefer the idea of eqpt asset tracking. Having worked in what was
>supposedly a "secure" establishment it was surprising how much eqpt was
>"borrowed" without anyone knowing it had been moved until it was due
>calibration. Manual checking of assets is a time consuming pain in the neck.
>Also at "Interop":-
><http://www.techworld.com/mobility/features/index.cfm?featureID=3397&pagtype=samecatsamechan>

In the mid 1980's, I worked on a failed product that was essentially
an equipment tracker. It used the AC power lines and was based on a
bi-directional expansion of the Pico/BSR/X10 power line data protocol.
It was primarily for building energy management, but it would identify
the location of anything that was plugged into the power line using
TDR techniques. It wasn't very reliable, but was good enough and
quite fairly cheap. Funding died when the stock market collapsed in
late 1987. I'm surprised the idea hasn't been resurrected.

When you talk about "asset tracking" or "equipment tracking", it
invariably spreads into "people tracking". That precipitates the
inevitable discussion on privacy, Big Brother, surveillance, and civil
rights. The various companies selling Wi-Fi location systems are not
very interested in tracking test equipment or using expensive WhereNet
tags.
<http://www.wherenet.com>
They want to track users with laptops, PDA's, and Wi-Fi enabled cell
phones. The loss of a few pieces of test equipment is nothing
compared to the security implications of having an uncontrolled
wireless data connection or rouge AP on the inside of the firewall.
It's fairly easy to detect most unauthorized wireless AP's or clients.
What's difficult is accurately locating them within the range of the
sniffer. I was once involved in locating one such rogue AP. It took
me two full work days using every trick I knew. If the perpetrator
hadn't made a stupid mistake, I would never have found him. The
current direction finding technology proposes to automate the process.
I'll reserve my usual cynical remarks until I get to play with
equipment.

Incidentally, one of my summer jobs in Kollege was helping build a
calibration lab for an aerospace company. Security was everywhere. I
suspect I was hired because of my ability to efficiently steal things
when necessary (in addition to my knowledge of test equipment). It
came in handy when a piece of test equipment needed calibration and
the current user was not interested in releasing it. The really evil
techs would remove the wheels from the scope carts. They knew that
nobody would try to carry those boat anchors away for calibration.
These days, they just unscrew the handles and hide them.


--
Jeff Liebermann jeffl@comix.santa-cruz.ca.us
150 Felker St #D http://www.LearnByDestroying.com
Santa Cruz CA 95060 http://802.11junk.com
Skype: JeffLiebermann AE6KS 831-336-2558

Jeff Liebermann wrote:
> kev <invalid@invalid.invalid> hath wroth:
>
>> I prefer the idea of eqpt asset tracking. Having worked in what was
>> supposedly a "secure" establishment it was surprising how much eqpt was
>> "borrowed" without anyone knowing it had been moved until it was due
>> calibration. Manual checking of assets is a time consuming pain in the neck.
>> Also at "Interop":-
>> <http://www.techworld.com/mobility/features/index.cfm?featureID=3397&pagtype=samecatsamechan>
>
> In the mid 1980's, I worked on a failed product that was essentially
> an equipment tracker. It used the AC power lines and was based on a
> bi-directional expansion of the Pico/BSR/X10 power line data protocol.
> It was primarily for building energy management, but it would identify
> the location of anything that was plugged into the power line using
> TDR techniques. It wasn't very reliable, but was good enough and
> quite fairly cheap. Funding died when the stock market collapsed in
> late 1987. I'm surprised the idea hasn't been resurrected.
>
> When you talk about "asset tracking" or "equipment tracking", it
> invariably spreads into "people tracking". That precipitates the
> inevitable discussion on privacy, Big Brother, surveillance, and civil
> rights. The various companies selling Wi-Fi location systems are not
> very interested in tracking test equipment or using expensive WhereNet
> tags.
> <http://www.wherenet.com>
> They want to track users with laptops, PDA's, and Wi-Fi enabled cell
> phones. The loss of a few pieces of test equipment is nothing
> compared to the security implications of having an uncontrolled
> wireless data connection or rouge AP on the inside of the firewall.
Snip
Several years ago after having a weeks holiday I came back to find that
a then brand new Marconi 6200B(20Ghhz version) with it's associated 6210
and a HP83731A, all of which I had signed for, had gone walkabout and
no-one would admit to knowing where they had gone.It took several days
to find out that one of the development sections had borrowed it,
without signing out in the loans book, and failed to return it before
they went on holiday. To say I was not amused would be an understatement.
>
> Incidentally, one of my summer jobs in Kollege was helping build a
> calibration lab for an aerospace company. Security was everywhere. I
> suspect I was hired because of my ability to efficiently steal things
> when necessary (in addition to my knowledge of test equipment). It
> came in handy when a piece of test equipment needed calibration and
> the current user was not interested in releasing it. The really evil
> techs would remove the wheels from the scope carts. They knew that
> nobody would try to carry those boat anchors away for calibration.
> These days, they just unscrew the handles and hide them.
>
>

kev <invalid@invalid.invalid> hath wroth:

>Several years ago after having a weeks holiday I came back to find that
>a then brand new Marconi 6200B(20Ghhz version) with it's associated 6210
>and a HP83731A, all of which I had signed for, had gone walkabout and
>no-one would admit to knowing where they had gone.It took several days
>to find out that one of the development sections had borrowed it,
>without signing out in the loans book, and failed to return it before
>they went on holiday. To say I was not amused would be an understatement.

I don't think you would have enjoyed having me around. I had the
opposite problem. When I started working for Granger Assoc, I was
given a tour of the plant and all it's various divisions (under the
same roof at the time). Lots of really nice nifty test equipment. We
were right next door to HP Neely Sales, which certainly helped get the
latest and greatest toys.

However, I soon discovered that Granger was compartmentalized and that
all the nifty test equipment could not be officially borrowed. My
group didn't even have a budget and I needed equipment immediately. I
made some informal arrangements and took care to return things exactly
as I had taken them, even down to putting the controls and test cables
back. I always left a note indicating what was missing and who was
borrowing it. This was a major accomplishment at 1AM as I could only
borrow things after hours.

After a month or three of this nonsense, I was getting very tired of
these nightly exercises. I was also getting physically tired and
started to make mistakes. Some departments also didn't like the
temporary arrangement that showed all the indications of becoming
permanent. So, I took to borrowing without asking, and not being very
careful about how I returned things. However, I always left a note
(and still do to this day). Incidentally, I wasn't just borrowing
test equipment.

Eventually, I was rescued from an early demise and impending lynching
by the timely arrival of a workable budget. Equipment was duly leased
and purchased. I agreed to stop my night time raids, cease lock
picking, and return my horde of stolen test leads and scope probes. Of
course, that didn't last. Once a borrower, always a borrower. I
vaguely recall some strange comment on my first review about being
"overly aggressive at getting the job done".

RFID or equipment tracking wouldn't have even slowed me down. I even
picked some locks and carried a supply of furniture casters. I left
notes as to my intentions and was unscrupulously honest about my
borrowing habits. If I had caught the person that borrowed all your
test equipment, I would not have even mentioned the act of borrowing
or forgetting to return the equipment, but would have recommended him
for human sacrifice for not leaving a note.

I think I once mentioned that I helped build a college FM radio
station using 100% donated, borrowed, or stolen materials and
equipment, so I won't go into that again.

--
Jeff Liebermann jeffl@comix.santa-cruz.ca.us
150 Felker St #D http://www.LearnByDestroying.com
Santa Cruz CA 95060 http://802.11junk.com
Skype: JeffLiebermann AE6KS 831-336-2558

Jeff Liebermann wrote:

> RFID or equipment tracking wouldn't have even slowed me down. I even
> picked some locks and carried a supply of furniture casters. I left
> notes as to my intentions and was unscrupulously honest about my
> borrowing habits. If I had caught the person that borrowed all your
> test equipment, I would not have even mentioned the act of borrowing
> or forgetting to return the equipment, but would have recommended him
> for human sacrifice for not leaving a note.
>

If he had signed the loan book it would have helped. It was one of those
things that happen at just the wrong time, my section had a spot QA
check that week and the team picked up on this straight away after going
through the documentation of equipment I had on loan and how I
controlled it. I got a b********g , the dev manager got a b********g and
several procedures were rewritten.
We were lucky it was an internal inspection and not an external one
as several other failings came to light in the follow up. Shortly
afterwards we acquired an asset manager and all equipment was controlled
by his staff and it's location was placed on a readily available
Database on the Intranet. Any loans then had to go through the asset
manager's staff or the line manager was in trouble.